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  Matching grants are a prevalent mechanism for funding environmental, conservation, and 
natural resource projects. However, economists have largely been silent regarding the poten-
tial benefits of these mechanisms at increasing voluntary contributions. To examine the behav-
ioral responses to different match levels, this research uses controlled laboratory experiments 
with generically framed instructions and introduces a general-form matching-grant mecha-
nism, referred to as the proportional contribution mechanism (PCM). Results show that contri-
butions are positively correlated with both the match and the induced value of the public good 
even when a dominant strategy is free-riding. An implication of this partial demand revelation 
result is that manifestations of this type of “helping hand” social preference should be counted 
in benefit-cost analysis. 
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The most common mechanism for charitable do-
nations is a matching grant that is implemented 
through the income and estate tax systems (see 
Table 1 for examples of various countries that 
have tax incentives to promote charitable giving). 
In these cases, the true cost of the charitable con-
tribution for the individual donor is a fraction of 
the actual donation since the individual will have 
his or her tax bill reduced by an amount that de-
pends on the individual’s applicable tax rate. Ac-
cording to the Giving USA Foundation (2009), in 
2008 annual charitable giving in the United States 
exceeded $300 billion, with more than $229 bil-
lion of this amount coming directly from indivi-
duals. Previous studies have reported that match-
ing forms of subsidy and tax deduction mecha-
nisms for public goods generally are quite suc-
cessful, and that an increase in the matching level 
significantly increases total donations (see, e.g., 
Eckel and Grossman 2003, Eckel and Grossman 
2008, Peloza and Steel 2005, and Randolph 1995). 
  Matching grants are used extensively in the 
funding of environmental, conservation, and natu-
ral resource projects (see, e.g., Rondeau and List 
2008). Not only do individuals donate approxi-
mately $6.6 billion to environmental and animal 
welfare causes (Giving USA Foundation 2009), 
but leading federal programs, such as the Land 
and Water Conservation Fund, the USDA Forest 
Legacy Program, and the U.S. Army’s Compati-
ble Use Buffer Program, which collectively have 
annual funding of approximately $450 million, 
traditionally require partners to provide financial 
matches of 20–50 percent of the total project cost. 
According to the U.S. General Accounting Of-
fice, more than two-thirds of all federal grants, 
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Table 1. Examples of Individual Income and 
Estate Tax Rates for Countries That Have 




Tax Rate  Estate Tax 
Austria 21–50%  15% 
Belgium 25–50%  30% 
Denmark 38–59%  15% 
Finland 7–30.5%  16% 
France 5.5–40%  40% 
Germany 14–45%  30% 
Greece 0–40%  20% 
Ireland 20–41%  20% 
Japan 5–50%  70% 
Netherlands 0–52%  27% 
Norway 28–49%  20% 
Spain 24–43%  34% 
United Kingdom  0–40%  40% 
United States  21–50%  46% 




nearly $150 billion in total, involved a matching 
grant (Huber and Runkel 2006). Other examples 
of the use of matching grants for large-scale en-
vironmental projects include federal efforts to 
restore southern Florida’s ecosystems and the Ev-
erglades; the federal Transportation Enhance-
ments Program for projects such as conservation 
of scenic areas, the development of multi-use 
trails, and environmental mitigation ($10 billion 
total since 1992); and the federal Water and Waste 
Disposal grant program. 
  In most cases, the matches are not direct one-
to-one arrangements; instead, the amount of the 
match varies given the circumstance. For in-
stance, conservation organizations such as The 
Nature Conservancy have sought “bargain sales” 
from landowners where, in effect, the organiza-
tion and the individual landowner enter into a 
matching-grant arrangement to preserve a parcel. 
In state-level agricultural land protection pro-
grams, such as in Delaware and Maryland, the 
government has provided a varying level of match 
to landowners who voluntarily agree to put their 
lands into conservation easements. To date, these 
two programs collectively have spent nearly $500 
million to preserve more than 350,000 acres. In 
Delaware, the match level has varied from 0 per-
cent to 100 percent, with the average match pro-
vided by the landowner being 53 percent (Messer 
and Allen, forthcoming). 
  Despite the widespread use of matching grants 
to fund environmental projects and public goods, 
economic theory offers little explanation as to 
why the mechanism may be useful or why the 
level of matching influences the amount of dona-
tions. Certainly, the idea of having a donor’s con-
tributions matched by another source can be intui-
tively perceived as a cost-effective way of fund-
ing the public good. However, in most cases the 
situations and proposed matches are not incen-
tive-compatible from the perspective of the poten-
tial donor. In other words, despite the matching 
grant, an individual’s Nash equilibrium behavior 
in the standard economic theory remains to con-
tribute nothing to the public good, especially 
when the number of potential donors is very large 
(Andreoni 1988). 
  A key issue to this research is how we can in-
terpret positive contributions that occur in the 
field even when an individual’s Nash equilibrium 
is, in theory, to contribute nothing (hereafter we 
call this behavior of positive contribution an 
“over-contribution”). A possible explanation for 
over-contribution is Andreoni’s concept of “warm 
glow” or some other type of intrinsic motivation 
(see Brekke, Kverndokk, and Nyborg 2003). How-
ever, existing theories do not fully explain why 
the level of matching significantly impacts the 
total amount of donations. This paper seeks to 
provide some additional explanation for the na-
ture of contributions observed in a matching grant 
by introducing a new explanation that is referred 
to as the “helping hand” hypothesis. 
  Whereas Andreoni (1995) conjectured that warm 
glow is a pervasive feature of non-coercive vol-
untary mechanisms, we hypothesize that the de-
gree of over-contributions that may arise from 
warm glow or altruism is a function of whether 
the voluntary mechanism is incentive-compati-
ble.
1 More specifically, our helping hand hy-
pothesis can be explained as follows: When a per-
son faces an external mechanism that is not incen-
                                                                                    
1 Examples exist where warm glow is not present in coercive public 
good mechanisms (see, for instance, Falkinger et al. 2000 and Messer 
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tive-compatible and seems unlikely to provide a 
socially optimal level of the public good, the indi-
vidual gains some utility by undertaking socially 
responsible behaviors. Once the mechanism is ad-
justed to be incentive-compatible and thus seems 
likely to provide the socially optimal level of the 
public good, the individual no longer offers a 
helping hand, but instead focuses on maximizing 
her personal payoff, bringing the individual’s be-
havior closely in line with the Nash equilibrium 
prediction. 
  To examine the behavioral responses to differ-
ent levels of matching in a voluntary contribution 
mechanism and to test the helping hand hypothe-
sis, this research uses controlled laboratory ex-
periments and introduces a new, general form of 
the matching grant, referred to as the Proportional 
Contribution Mechanism (PCM). The PCM can 
be considered a general-form extension of a match-
ing-grant or a tax-rebate mechanism.
2 The key at-
tributes of the PCM are that (i) the level of match 
can be modified by adjusting one parameter that 
represents a price of voluntary contribution, (ii) it 
can be modified to be either incentive-compatible 
or not by adjusting the same parameter, and (iii) it 
enables within-subject examination of behavior in 
single-shot settings. These attributes make the 
PCM well-suited for studying voluntary contribu-
tion behavior since the level of match, efficiency 
of the mechanism, and induced value of the pub-
lic good can be readily adjusted to examine vari-
ous situations in a controlled setting.
3 
  Our experiments conducted under the PCM 
yield a set of novel results that contribute to the 
existing literature in several ways. First, we suc-
cessfully demonstrate that when the PCM is in-
                                                                                    
2 A matching grant can be mathematically equivalent to a tax rebate 
although people may behave differently in these two settings (see, e.g., 
Eckel and Grossman 2003). The tax rebate can be considered the most 
fundamental match that people consider when they contribute to 
charities. 
3 The PCM should not confused with the provision point mechanism 
(PPM) as the two mechanisms differ fundamentally with respect to the 
condition of providing the public good. In the PPM, a public good is 
provided only when the sum of the contributions exceeds a pre-set 
threshold. Otherwise, the public good is not provided and, in the case 
of a PPM with a money-back guarantee, the contributions are returned 
to the donor (for a further discussion see Messer, Kaiser, and Schulze 
2008). Therefore, the outcome is binary as either the public good is 
fully provided or not. In contrast, with the PCM, partial funding of the 
public good is possible when the sum of contributions does not exceed 
the pre-set cap for the level of the public good. When contributions ex-
ceed the capped level, the public good is still provided at that capped 
level. This feature enables the PCM to be both incentive-compatible 
and non–incentive-compatible by varying just one parameter. 
centive-compatible, people do not over-contrib-
ute, but follow Nash predictions. That is consis-
tent with the helping hand hypothesis in an in-
centive-compatible case. To the best of our knowl-
edge, this PCM is the first voluntary mechanism 
that is both empirically and experimentally 
proven to work in the sense that contributions 
within the mechanism generate an efficient level 
of a public good when it is set to be incentive-
compatible.
4 
  Second, this research suggests that over-contri-
butions emerge only when the voluntary mecha-
nism is not incentive-compatible. This implies 
that the degree of over-contribution depends on 
the efficiency of the mechanism. Thus, the help-
ing hand hypothesis is supported even in a non–
incentive-compatible case. In addition, we show 
that the degree of over-contribution increases 
with the induced values of the public good and is 
proportional to the level of matching even when 
the dominant strategy is free-riding. 
  Third, with these findings we provide a new 
interpretation for over-contributions observed in a 
non–incentive-compatible case; that is, contribu-
tions observed in a non–incentive-compatible 
mechanism can be interpreted as partial demand 
revelation rather than a simple manifestation of 
“warm glow” or “non-paternalistic altruism” since 
they reflect, in part, the value of public goods as 
well as the level of matching (or simply prices). 
  We assert that a series of the aforementioned 
findings in voluntary contributions can be estab-
lished only by systematically manipulating whether 
an underlying voluntary mechanism is incentive-
compatible or not. Overall, these results imply 
that people have significant concerns about effi-
ciency when considering the funding of public 
goods. However, once efficiency is achieved, 
people lose the motivation to help or to over-con-
tribute. The contribution patterns observed in this 
experiment are generally consistent with some 
previous experimental field research (see, e.g., 
Karlan and List 2007); however, this work’s 
                                                                                    
4 There is a coercive and incentive-compatible mechanism, which is 
proven to work empirically. Falkinger et al. (2000) experimentally 
demonstrate a mechanism that enables subjects to provide an efficient 
level of public goods with a mix of subsidy and taxation schemes. For 
voluntary mechanisms that are not incentive-compatible, the use of 
context—such as involving groups in repeated discussion or a combi-
nation of discussion, voting, and status quo change—has been shown 
to yield socially optimal results for public goods in laboratory experi-
ments (Brosig, Weimann, and Ockenfels 2003, Messer et al. 2007). Kotani, Messer, and Schulze  Matching Grants and Charitable Giving   327 
 
 
novelty derives from the fact that our research 
provides a more consistent explanation for why 
contributions are sensitive to the level of match-
ing or subsidy as well as to the value of public 
goods observed in the field. 
  The results of this research provide some po-
tential implications for the measurement of bene-
fits from environmental and natural resource pro-
jects. There has been a long debate of whether the 
“willingness to pay” (WTP) estimates or voluntary 
contributions motivated by impure altruism should 
be counted in benefit-cost analysis. Some re-
searchers argue that such contributions do not re-
flect any economic value of a public good, and 
that thus the WTP estimates should not be counted 
as an economic valuation of the public good (see, 
e.g., Kahneman and Knetsch 1992). In contrast, 
other researchers have argued that the WTP esti-
mates are sensitive to the value of public goods, 
at least in some cases, and that therefore these 
values should be counted in benefit-cost analysis 
(see, e.g., Bateman et al. 2004). Our results sup-
port the latter in the sense that voluntary contribu-
tions reflect the economic value of the public 
goods even when these contributions are moti-
vated by some sort of impure altruism and when 
the mechanism is not incentive-compatible where 
a dominant strategy is free-riding. This paper 
concludes by providing an alternative explanation 
of “helping hand” for why the voluntary contribu-
tions should be counted in the benefit-cost 
analysis. 
 
Experimental Design and Procedures 
 
All experiments were conducted in the Labora-
tory for Experimental Economics and Decision 
Research (LEEDR) at Cornell University. The sub-
ject pool consisted of ninety undergraduate stu-
dents recruited from introductory economics and 
business classes. An experimental session took 
approximately forty-five minutes and each sub-
ject earned an average of fifteen U.S. dollars. 
Subjects were randomly appointed to a computer 
with a privacy shield and assigned to a group of 
three people. Subjects in the same group were not 
seated near each other and no communication was 
allowed between subjects. Subjects received writ-
ten instructions, and the administrator provided 
oral instructions and answered any questions. 
  After a couple of practice rounds, subjects 
made fifteen confidential decisions on various 
public good programs where they could donate 
any amount between $0 and $10. Each program 
had a different level of match and different size of 
the public good (Table 2). Similar to Messer et al. 
(2010), the fifteen decisions were single-shot as 
there was no feedback between decisions, and the 
final determination of which three programs (one 
for each level of the public good) resulted in pay-
off to the subjects was determined at the end of 
the experiment by a random draw by a volunteer 
subject. 
  All sessions involved the PCM that can be de-
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where πi is the personal payoff for each subject i, 
wi is the endowment, gi is the contribution to the 
public good, b is a proportional contribution pa-
rameter,  G
0 is the capped return of the public 
goods, and N is the group size. A key feature of 
the PCM is that the proportion of contribution (re-
ferred to as b) can be modified to make the 
mechanism incentive-compatible. 
 When  b=1, subjects pay the entire amount of 
their contribution and the mechanism is the same 
as a standard VCM [see footnote 2 for more de-
tailed descriptions about the differences between 
PCM and the provision point mechanism (PPM)]. 
If, instead, b=0.5, then the subjects have to pay 
only one-half of the contribution (similar to a 
matching grant, tax deductions, or tax rebate).
5 
For  b ≤ 1/3, the PCM is incentive-compatible in 
groups of three people. The main advantage of 
the PCM is that subjects’ willingness to pay (WTP) 
can be compared in a within-subject single-shot 
environment in which the mechanism is and is not 
incentive-compatible. Induced values, defined as 
the maximum payoff each subject can obtain from 
the public good, are obtained by capping indivi-
dual payoffs from the public good (see Rondeau, 
Poe, and Schulze 2005). We will further discuss 
this feature in this section. 
 
                                                                                    
5 The different incentive schemes can be arranged in the way that they 
become mathematically equivalent [see Eckel and Grossman (2003 and 
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Table 2. A Summary of Experimental Design 
with Respect to b, G
0,
 and a Number of 
Subjects and Observations 
 
# of 
subjects  b  G
0 (or v)  # of obs. 
Situation 1  90  0.1   90 
Situation 2  90  0.2   90 
Situation 3  90  1/3  6(or 2)  90 
Situation 4  90  0.6   90 
Situation 5  90  0.9   90 
Situation 6  90  0.1   90 
Situation 7  90  0.2   90 
Situation 8  90  1/3  15(or 5)  90 
Situation 9  90  0.6   90 
Situation 10  90  0.9   90 
Situation 11  90  0.1   90 
Situation 12  90  0.2   90 
Situation 13  90  1/3  24(or 8)  90 
Situation 14  90  0.6   90 
Situation 15  90  0.9   90 
 
 
  In these experiments, each subject in a group of 
three people (N=3) was endowed with ten “ex-
perimental dollars” (wi=10). Using these pa-
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To understand this choice setting, let us outline 
several key definitions and important facts of the 
individual contribution problem [equation (1)]. 
 
Definition 1 (Induced Value). The induced value 
of the public good is defined as the maximum pay-
off each subject can obtain from the public good 
in a group. The feature originates from the kinked 
payoff function in the public good at the level of 
G
0. In this experiment, the induced values v are 
equivalent to G
0/3, which is a Pareto optimal (P.O.) 
contribution that each subject must give for social 
or group efficiency. 
 Remark  1. 
  
0     
      -     (0,1)
   0 
      -     1.
Any allocation satisfying G G is
Pareto optimal if b
Any allocation satisfying G is
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Prediction 2 (Symmetric N.E.). Under the PCM 
with N=3 and wi = 10: 
i.  if b ∈ (0, 1 / 3), a symmetric N.E. is 
*
i g = v = 
G
0/3 
ii.  if b=1/3, a symmetric N.E. is 
*
i g  ∈ [0,v] = 
[0,G
0/3] 
iii.  if b ∈ (1 / 3 ,1 ] ,  a symmetric N.E. is 
*
i g =0 .  In 
fact, strategy 
*
i g =0  is a unique dominant 
strategy in this case. 
  Throughout this paper, our focus is on a sym-
metric N.E. as a benchmark for theoretical pre-
dictions. In fact, similar to a continuous contribu-
tion under a provision point mechanism (Cadsby 
and Maynes 1999), there are an infinite number 
of asymmetric Nash equilibria. This point follows 
from Prediction 1. Following previous experimen-
tal research, we assume that a symmetric N.E. 
should work as a prediction as well as a focal 
point of the type of coordination games, as in our 
experiments (see, e.g., Cadsby and Maynes 1999, 
Schelling 1981). 
Remark 2. Predictions 1 and 2 yield the follow-
ing result: 
The PCM is 
  
-   ( 0 , 1 / 3 ]
-   [ 1 / 3 , 1 ] .  
incentive compatible if b




In addition, b=1/3 is the cut-off point that divides 
the incentive-compatibility of the PCM. Hence, at 
this cut-off, the PCM may or may not be incentive-
compatible. 
 
Notice that when  (0,1/3] b∈ , the mechanism is 
incentive-compatible in the sense that subjects are Kotani, Messer, and Schulze  Matching Grants and Charitable Giving   329 
 
 
induced to honestly reveal the maximum value of 
the public good, v. 
  To test the helping hand hypothesis, we employ 
five different values of the proportional contribu-
tion parameter  {} 0.1,0.2,1/3,0.6,0.9 b =  for each 
value of  {}
0 $6,$15,$24 . G =  Here, note that each 
value of  {} 0.1,0.2,1/3,0.6,0.9 b =  can be trans-
lated into the ratios 1:9, 1:4, 1:2, 1:0.666…, and 
1:0.111 in a matching grant, respectively. This 
ratio can be understood through an example of 
b=0.5 for which the matching ratio is a 1:1 
match. 
 For  b∈{0.1,0.2}, the PCM is incentive-com-
patible so that the symmetric N.E. strategy and a 
P.O. contribution are to give induced values of 
v=G
0/3. If  {} 0.6,0.9 , b∈  then the PCM is not in-
centive-compatible, so the N.E. strategy is to give 
nothing, but the P.O. contribution is for each sub-
ject to give v=G
0/3. When b=1/3, the mecha-
nism is both incentive- and non–incentive-com-
patible, as noted in Prediction 2. The choice of 
these five values of b allows a comparison of how 
the two incentive-compatible (b={0.1,0.2}) and 
the two non–incentive-compatible (b={0.6,0.9}) 
mechanisms yield different results with one cut-
off value of b=1/3. 
  The experiment procedures were as follows. 
First, subjects participated in hypothetical prac-
tice rounds for up to five minutes. The spread-
sheet on each subject’s computer screen (equipped 
with a privacy shield) was programmed with 
Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) so that each 
subject could input his or her own hypothetical 
contribution and the other two subjects’ hypo-
thetical contributions for all fifteen treatments. 
The spreadsheet was programmed so that it gen-
erated the payoff consequences for a group after 
all three contributions were entered. Subjects 
were also asked to perform two primary tasks in 
the practice. The first task was to try at least the 
following three cases: the individual contributes 
(i) less than others, (ii) the same as others, and 
(iii) more than others. The second task was to 
identify the best strategy by imagining how the 
other two subjects in a group would contribute. 
  The purpose of practice rounds was twofold: to 
minimize any confusion and random decision er-
ror, and to give subjects sufficient time to think 
about each decision. After the practice rounds, 
subjects participated in rounds that involved 
monetary payoffs. Each subject submitted one 
contribution for each value of b={0.1,0.2,1/3, 
0.6,0.9}. This procedure was done for each value 
of  G
0={$6,$15,$24}. Therefore, each subject 
completed fifteen different contribution situations 
and determined his or her contributions without 
feedback. In other words, no subject knew what 
his or her payoff was or the contributions of the 
other subjects in his or her group until after all 
fifteen decisions were made. Finally, there were 
ninety observations in each situation since ninety 
subjects were recruited, of whom each provided a 
single contribution decision for each of the fifteen 
different contribution situations. Therefore, this 
experiment results in 1,350 (=90×15) observa-
tions. The fifteen situations each subject faced are 
summarized in Table 2. 
  To prevent potential order effects, the order in 
which the decisions were presented was random-
ized. As explained to the subjects at the end of the 
experiment, payoffs were determined by ran-
domly drawing, with replacement, one labeled 
chip out of five for each of the three cases of G
0. 
Each of the five labeled chips represented one of 
the five possible values of b. 
 
Conceptual Framework of the Helping Hand 
Hypothesis 
 
In this section, we outline the conceptual frame-
work of the helping hand hypothesis. Similar to 
the approaches by Andreoni and Miller (2002) 
and Charness and Rabin (2002), we assume that 
the utility function for subject i is represented as a 
linear weighting function of her personal payoff 
and that of others in her group. Assume a group 
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represents the personal payoff for subject i= 
{1,2,3}, and λi∈[0,1] is a parameter that cap-
tures how much individual i  cares about the pay-
offs of others in her group. We employ this sepa-330    April 2010  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 
 
 
rably additive form since a simple weighting 
function can capture altruistic preferences in the 
dictator games and many other game-theoretic 
settings (see, e.g., Andreoni and Miller 2002, Char-
ness and Rabin 2002).
6 Additionally, we further 
assume that each individual may be motivated by 
some internal motivation called the helping hand. 
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where αif(gi,v) is the helping hand term for sub-
ject i, and  i + α∈ \  is a parameter that captures 
how much subject i is affected by the helping 
hand motivation. To be consistent with the 
helping hand hypothesis, we assume that fg(gi,v)> 
0,  fgg(gi,v)<0,  ∀gi∈[0,v), and f(u,v)=m ax g 
f(gi,v).
7 
  The helping hand motivation should be inter-
preted as the strength of the desire the individual i 
has to give a socially optimal contribution of v, 
irrespective of the payoff consequence.
8 The 
helping hand motivation can also be considered to 
be psychological, outcome-insensitive, and re-
lated to intrinsic motivation such as morality, 
while the altruism motivation is considered to be 
outcome-sensitive and directly related to material 
payoffs, including payoffs to others. Therefore, 
the helping hand motivation is a type of warm 
glow motivation or impure altruism of the type 
described by Andreoni (1988); however, it ex-
tends Andreoni’s concept to characterize the in-
ternal motivation for voluntary contribution by 
relating actual contributions to the induced values 
of the public good. 
                                                                                    
6 There exists an exception in the literature. Landry et al. (2006) as-
sume that warm glow is specified as a non-linear and concave function 
f (g i), where gi is an individual contribution. More specifically, it is as-
sumed to be strictly increasing and concave. 
7 We may assume that fg(gi, v) = 0 for gi ∈ [v,wi]. In fact, any as-
sumption that does not affect the result f (v,v)=m a xf(g,v) can be as-
sumed to be consistent with the helping hand hypothesis. 
8 Some authors claim that a socially optimal contribution of v is iden-
tified from social welfare maximization for each individual where in-
trinsic payoffs such as warm glow are not counted as a part of social 
welfare measurement (see, e.g., Elster 1989, Andreoni 2006). In other 
words, each individual identifies what is a socially desirable action by 
looking at social welfare excluding parts related to intrinsic moti-
vation. Thus, the definition of v in this paper follows this line of argu-
ment. 
  In the experimental economics literature, warm 
glow is specified as a linear function of the con-
tribution, gi; i.e., f(⋅)=cgi, where c is some posi-
tive parameter to be estimated (see, e.g., Palfrey 
and Prisbrey 1997, Goeree, Holt, and Laury 2002). 
This specification implies that people obtain more 
warm glow simply by giving more regardless of 
the external situation. Thus, with this definition, it 
is difficult to distinguish such giving from the 
level of induced values. In contrast, the functional 
assumptions for the helping hand term capture 
both the situation in which people gain this type 
of marginal satisfaction and the situation in which 
they do not. The marginal benefit of giving based 
on the helping hand motivation is diminishing as 
the voluntary contribution gets closer to induced 
values of the public good, v, i.e., fgg(gi,v)<0.
9 
Also, the satisfaction from this helping hand mo-
tivation is assumed to reach the maximum level 
when each subject contributes the induced values 
of the public good. 
  The original work of warm glow by Andreoni 
(1989) suggests a general functional form of util-
ity, which is generally assumed to be concave and 
not necessarily restricted to a linear function of 
cgi. The linear specification of warm glow as 
adopted in experimental research does not fully 
capture his idea, nor does it provide the logic as 
to why the level of match might influence volun-
tary contributions. The intent of introducing the 
helping hand motivation in this model is to refine 
the warm glow idea by relating utility with an 
induced value in a general form of concave func-
tions, αif(gi,v). With this approach, we conjec-
ture a model that better explains the positive im-
pact of matching on voluntary contributions.
10 
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9 This assumption of diminishing intrinsic motivations is also made in 
Landry et al. (2006), Schulze et al. (2002), and Frey and Oberholzer-Gee 
(1997). 
10 More precisely, Andreoni (1989) poses a general utility function of 
U (x, G, g), where x is a private good, G is a public good, and g is a 
private contribution to a public good. The new element of helping hand 
motivations is thus a refinement of the warm glow concept and is the 
introduction of induced value v in a utility function, i.e., U (x, G, g, v). 
In this paper, we introduce the helping hand term of α i f (g, v) in a 
separably additive way for the purpose of simplifying experimental set-
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0. Then the first-order conditions 
yield
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  As a benchmark for the prediction, we derive a 
symmetric N.E. under the assumption that each 
subject has the belief that the other two subjects 
in her group behave similarly, i.e., αi=αj, λi=λj, 
i≠ j. This assumption not only simplifies the deri-
vation of the equilibrium but is also based on evi-
dence of experimental research on one-shot social 
dilemma situations. Dawes, McTavish, and Shak-
lee (1977) show that in a social dilemma situa-
tion, an individual utilizes her own preference as 
information about what other people will do. 
They argue that “In the end, a subject may have a 
rational basis for believing that others in a group 
will do likewise. Whichever the source, the sub-
jects’ decisions themselves would lead them to 
believe that others’ decisions would be like theirs” 
(Dawes, McTavish, and Shaklee 1977). Elster 
(1989) supports their findings, and names the proc-
ess of developing such belief “magical thinking.” 
  Based on our assumption, we can derive the 
unique equilibrium strategy behind the individual 
contribution behavior. 
 
Prediction 3.  For  b ∈ (0,1/3),  λi ∈ [0,1],  and 
i + α∈ \ , the symmetric N.E. is 
* . i g v =
 
Prediction 4. For b ∈ [1/3,1], the symmetric N.E. 















is any contribution between 0 and v satis-
fying  (, ) 1 / 32/ 3 ig i i fg v b α≤ − + λ
 
and equal-
ity holds if 
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 Recall  that  αi and λi are the set of individual-
specific parameters that characterize voluntary 
contributions in the optimal strategy. Given the 
prediction of the symmetric N.E., all of the sub-
jects should contribute the induced values v when 
the PCM is incentive-compatible. When the PCM 
is not incentive-compatible, then contributions 
depend on parameter values of αi and λi. The 
following three possible types of individual con-
tribution behaviors are expected: 
 
  ■ Selfish type. We call subject i a “selfish” type 
if αi = λi = 0. Selfish type individuals have the 
utility of ui = πi, and contribute 
 
 (4)   
*
 for 0 1/ 3
any value between 0 and   for  1/ 3










  ■ Pure altruist. We call subject i a “pure altruist” 
type if αi =0
 
and λi ∈(0,1]. Pure altruists have 
the utility of ui = πi + λi  j
ji ≠

















  In addition, we call subject i a “perfect altru-
ist” if λi = 1,  and note that such individuals 
contribute 
*
i g = v for all the treatments of b = 
{ } 0.1,0.2,1/ 3,0.6,0.9 . 
 
  ■ Helping hand type. We call subject i a “help-
ing hand” type if αi>0 and λi≥0. Helping 
hand individuals have the utility of 
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   and  contribute 
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any value between 0 and   satisfying
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The condition of weak inequality implies that 
equality holds if 
*
i g >0; otherwise strict inequal-
ity holds. This strategy implies that when b= 
{} 0.1,0.2,1/3 , the subject contributes 
*
i g =v.  If 
{ } 0.6,0.9 b = , subjects contribute some value be-
tween 0 and v, depending on the set of individual 
specific parameters (αi,λi). When b approaches 
unity, contributions decrease gradually. 
  Finally, the predictions of the three types intro-
duced here—selfish, pure altruist, and helping 
hand—are graphically summarized in Figure 1, 
where the vertical axis is individual contribution, 
gi, and the horizontal axis is proportional pa-
rameter, b.
11 
  Andreoni and Miller (2002) show that in a dic-
tator game, altruistic preferences satisfy the strong 
axiom of revealed preference, and that about 70 
percent of subjects’ altruistic preferences can be 
represented as a linear weighting utility function 
of one’s own payoff and that of others. They 
report that one-half of the subjects can be classi-
fied as the selfish type—that is, ui=πi—and that 
about 20 percent are perfect altruists—i.e., ui= 
πi+πj. Based on their findings, we can conjecture 
that a majority of subjects will behave selfishly if 
people do not possess any helping hand motiva-
tion, so they follow the strategy of equation (4). 
On the other hand, perfect altruists should contri-
bute induced values for all the treatments in this 
experiment. 
  Notice that the introduction of the concept of 
the helping hand into the altruism framework 
accounts for the motivation that is particular to a 
voluntary contribution game. Even if most indi-
viduals are classified as selfish in the altruism 
framework, we claim that such individuals will, if 
they possess the helping hand motive, give con-
tributions that fall close to the induced values of 
the public good even when b=1/3. Alternatively, 
when  b={0.6,0.9}, they contribute some inter-
mediate value between 0 and v and gradually de-
crease their contributions as b gets closer to one. 
Intuitively, this contribution behavior is possible 
                                                                                    
11 The logit equilibrium concept—developed by Anderson, Goeree, 
and Holt (1998)—may yield qualitatively the same predictions made 
by the helping hand model if decision errors are assumed to be 
significant. More precisely, the model of a pure altruist under the logit 
equilibrium can yield the same predictions as the one with the helping 
hand models suggested in this paper. Due to this fact, the practice 
rounds were included as part of the experiment design to minimize the 
influence of decision errors in the experiments. 
only in the presence of some helping hand moti-
vation, i.e., αi>0. 
  Recall that the average contribution lies be-
tween zero and the P.O. contribution in previous 
public goods experiments (see, e.g., Davis and 
Holt 1992, Ledyard 1995).
12 Given previous evi-
dence and the data collected from this experi-
ment, we can translate the helping hand hypothe-
sis into a simple regression. That is, we can test 
whether the actual behaviors follow a symmetric 
N.E. of the helping hand model by running the 
following regression for each value of v={$2, 
$5,$8}. 
 
(7)     11 22 (1 / 3 ) (1 / 3 ) ik ik gcd b d b = +β − +β − +ε , 
 
where i=1,…,90 denotes the subject index; k= 
1,…,5 denotes the index of experiment treat-
ments, b={0.1,0.2,1/3,0.6,0.9}, or each induced 
value of the public good, v={$2,$5,$8};  εik 
represents the disturbances that are peculiar to 
both individuals and treatments; d1 is a dummy 
variable such that d1=1 if b={0.1,0.2,1/3}, 
otherwise 0; and d2 is a dummy variable such that 
d2=1 if b={1/3,0.6,0.9}, otherwise 0. 
  Finally, the helping hand hypothesis is trans-
lated into the preceding regression as follows. 
 
Helping Hand Hypothesis 
 
 i. 1 ˆ β  is sufficiently close to zero, being neither 
statistically significant nor economically signi-
ficant.
13 In other words, economic incentives 
given by proportional parameters b ∈ (0,1/3] are 
not an important factor for the contribution de-
cision since the helping hand model simply pre-
dicts that subjects contribute the induced value v 
for the public good. The intuition behind this 
prediction is that internal motivations repre-
sented by the helping hand are satiated at the 
point of 
*
i g v = . 
 
 ii.  2 ˆ β  is strictly negative, and is statistically signi-
ficant and economically significant. In addition, 
the estimate of  2 ˆ β  yields the prediction of over-
contributions. In other words, when the PCM is 
not incentive-compatible, subjects will not only 
                                                                                    
12 In most experiments, a P.O. contribution is in fact to give a whole 
endowment to a public good. 
13 We use the term “economic significance” as described in McClos-




Figure 1. Predictions of Three Types of Individuals 
 
 
   be motivated by the helping hand and altruism 
but will also want to maximize their personal 
payoffs. This is in contrast to the case of an in-
centive-compatible  PCM. Thus, a trade-off ex-
ists between selfish motives and both the help-
ing hand motivation and altruism. The helping 
hand hypothesis asserts that the estimate of  2 ˆ β  
is negative but statistically significant and that 
the level of contributions is some intermediate 
value between 0 and v. Also, contributions will 
decrease as b becomes larger. 
 iii. ˆ c  is statistically significant and close to v. In 
other words, the estimates of the intercept are 
equal to the induced values of the public good. 
  When all three of the hypotheses are simultane-
ously satisfied, the predictions of regression be-
come identical to the prediction of helping hand 




In this section, we first present the frequency dis-
tributions and descriptive statistics of voluntary 
contributions for each treatment. We then present 
the regression analysis. Figures 2, 3, and 4 are 
frequency distributions for each treatment of b= 
{0.1,0.2,1/3,0.6,0.9} with v={$2,$5,$8}, respec-
tively. The shapes of the frequency distributions 
shift similarly for all the treatments of v={2,5,8} 
when b changes. When the PCM is incentive-com-
patible for b={0.1,0.2,1/3}, the mode of distri-
bution for each induced value is v. When b= 
{0.6,0.9} and the PCM is not incentive-compati-
ble, the distributions exhibit diminishing fre-
quency over higher contributions. 
  Note that a number of subjects responded as if 
they were perfect altruists by contributing v even 
when  b={0.6,0.9} for all induced values. On 
average, 10 percent of the individuals contribute 
the induced value, even though the dominant 
strategy is to give nothing for selfish behavior in 
this case. These proportions approximate those 
found in related research. For example, 20 per-
cent of individuals were classified as perfect al-
truists in a dictator game (Andreoni and Miller 
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ous literature in the sense that a small number of 
individuals are highly altruistic and give induced 
values even when the mechanism is not incentive-
compatible. 
  A majority of individuals follow the pattern of 
contribution behaviors underlying the frequency 
distribution and contribute induced values of v or 
close to v when b={0.1,0.2,1/3}. Yet when b= 
{0.6,0.9}, most subjects reduce their contribu-
tions, and the degree of reduction varies: a large 
portion of individuals contribute between 0 and v, 
while the remainder become free-riders. Intui-
tively, such results correspond with the helping 
hand hypothesis. The potential cost of contribu-
tions strongly impacts a subject’s contribution be-
havior when the mechanism is not incentive-com-
patible. When the mechanism is incentive-com-
patible, the cost does not have the same degree of 
impact. 
  Table 3 shows the mean and median of con-
tributions for each treatment. This result can be 
understood better by combining the results from 
the frequency distributions. The modes of the fre-
quency distributions for b={0.1,0.2,1/3} corre-
spond to v. At the same time, the medians shown 
in Table 3 are identical to these modes except in 
the case of b=1/3 and v=$8. This again con-
firms that many individuals give the induced 
values when the mechanism is incentive-compati-
ble. Alternatively, when the PCM is not incentive-
compatible for b={0.6,0.9}, the mean and me-
dian are between zero and v. This result is con-
sistent with typical VCM experiments in that the 
average contributions are between zero and an ef-
ficient contribution. However, the new feature of 
this result is that contributions inversely react as 
the mean and median decrease when the cost of 
voluntary contribution is systematically increased 
from b=1/3 to b=0.9. Although the PCM with 
b=1/3 can also be viewed as non–incentive-
compatible, many individuals give contributions 
close to v. When b={0.6,0.9}, contributions lie 
between 0 and v and gradually decrease. 
  Figure 5 shows how the change in induced 
values of the public good, v={$2,$5,$8}, affects 
the mean and median of contributions for each 
proportional parameter b. The induced value of 
the public good is the horizontal axis, while the 
mean and median contributions are plotted on the 
vertical axis. The five lines each represent the 
mean/medians of contributions for the treatment 
of b={0.1,0.2,1/3,0.6,0.9}. An additional 45-de-
gree line that applies when contributions equal v 
is also drawn to show the degree of demand reve-
lation by comparing the five lines with that 45-
degree line. 
  Note that the median and the mean contribu-
tions are positively related to the induced values. 
In particular, under the non–incentive-compatible 
PCM, contributions remain positively related with 
induced values of the public good despite the 
N.E. of selfish individuals giving nothing. This 
corroborates the finding by Rondeau, Poe, and 
Schulze (2005) that voluntary contributions have 
a positive relationship with induced values even 
when the mechanism is not incentive-compatible. 
  Also note that the mean and median of contri-
butions more closely approximate the 45-degree 
line of induced values as proportional parameter b 
gets smaller. When the PCM is incentive-compati-
ble for b={0.1,0.2}, these values are very close 
or identical to the 45-degree line. This implies 
that the PCM is indeed demand-revealing when 
the cost of voluntary contribution gets sufficiently 
small. However, when the PCM is not incentive-
compatible for b={0.6,0.9}, the slope of the lines 
gets flatter. 
  Given the aforementioned statistical results, we 
ran a quantile regression of equation (7) for each 
value of v and tested whether the estimates of pa-
rameters conform to the helping hand hypothesis. 
The quantile regression technique proposed by 
Koenker and Bassett (1978) is applied since this 
technique is “robust” and more “efficient” than 
the least squares (LS) approach where the error 
term is not normally distributed and varies sys-
tematically with independent variables. In our 
case, the frequency distributions explicitly show 
that the independent variable, b, systematically 
changes the shape of the distribution in the de-
pendent (response) variable of contributions gi, 
and thus the assumption of normality is violated 
(see Figures 2, 3, and 4). Therefore, it is not ap-
propriate to apply the LS approach. However, for 
the purpose of the comparison, the LS estimates 
are also presented. 
  The quantile regressions estimate one parame-
ter vector for each quantile under weaker assump-
tions of the error term than those of the LS ap-
proach. The requirement is that Quantθ(εθi|b)=0 
for  θ∈[0,1], and no distributional assumptions 
on error terms are made. The quantile regression 
can be applied by pooling the panel data “na- 338    April 2010  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 
 
 
Table 3. Summary of Contributions ($) for Each Treatment 
  v = $2(G
0 = $6)
 
  b = 0.1  b = 0.2  b = 1/3  b = 0.6  b = 0.9 
Mean  2.34   2.10  1.65  0.98  0.80   
Median  2.00 2.00  2.00  1.00 0.40     
Std. dev.  1.86  1.64  1.15  1.02  1.07   
N.E.  2.00 2.00  [2.00,0.00]  0.00 0.00   
   v = $5(G
0 = $15)
 
  b = 0.1  b = 0.2  b = 1/3  b = 0.6  b = 0.9 
Mean  5.02 4.71  4.14  2.45 1.74   
Median  5.00  5.00  5.00   2.75   1.00   
Std. dev.  1.78  1.69  1.88   1.76   1.70  
N.E.  5.00 5.00  [5.00,0.00]  0.00 0.00     
  v = $8(G
0 = $24)
 
  b = 0.1  b = 0.2  b = 1/3  b = 0.6  b = 0.9 
Mean  7.32   6.82  5.82  3.26  2.55   
Median  8.00 8.00  6.42  3.00 1.52     
Std. dev.  2.04  2.01  2.55  2.68  2.66   
N.E.  8.00 8.00  [8.00,0.00]  0.00 0.00     




ively” and the estimator is still consistent (Lipsitz 
et al. 1997, Jung 1996). The standard errors of 
parameters of interest are derived by non-para-
metric bootstrap methods (see Buchinsky 1998). 
In addition, several quantile regressions for θ= 
{0.3,0.4,0.5,0.6,0.7,0.8} could be run to clarify 
the heterogeneity of contribution behaviors. For 
the purpose of comparison, the random effects 
model is employed as one result from the LS 
approaches.
14 
  The quantile regressions above the median (θ= 
{0.8,0.7,0.6,0.5}) show that the helping hand 
hypothesis holds. The estimates of the intercept 
are sufficiently close to the induced values of v, 
while  1 ˆ β  is not statistically significant at the 0.05 
                                                                                    
14 The Wu-Hausman test was conducted to determine whether a ran-
dom or fixed effects model is more appropriate. The result was in favor 
of the random effects model. In addition, we double-checked whether 
there are any order effects of three induced values v={2,5,8} that 
were randomly assigned for each session by including a set of dummy 
variables. Each dummy variable represents one sequence consisting of 
v={2,5,8}
 
that was implemented in a session. These tests find that 
none of the dummy variables exhibit statistical significance. Therefore, 
these dummy variables are omitted from the regressions in this manu-
script; however, they are available from the authors upon request. 
level or economically insignificant so that  1 ˆ 0 β≈   
for all the quantile regressions above the median 
of  θ={0.8,0.7,0.6,0.5} (see Table 2).
15 In con-
trast,  2 ˆ β  is statistically significant for all of the 
levels of the quantile regressions, and the esti-
mates show that contributions decrease as b gets 
bigger. These results imply that most subjects do 
not change their contribution behavior when the 
                                                                                    
15 In the case where b =1 / 3 ,  v = 8, and θ = 0.5, the estimate of the 
intercept is 6, and β1 is -8.57 and statistically significant (see Table 4). 
This exception to the broad trend is due to the fact that the number of 
subjects who contributed more than induced values did not reach the 
median, falling short by several subjects, though many subjects still 
contributed close to v. This result may be parallel with that in Saijo and 
Nakamura (1995). They also considered the incentive-compatible vol-
untary contribution mechanism; however, a dominant strategy is to give 
full contribution out of endowment. They found that many subjects did 
not make full contribution as theory predicts and concluded that the 
observed behaviors may be motivated by “spiteful motive” to increase 
the ranking of ultimate payoffs among subjects in a group rather than 
maximizing an individual subject’s own payoff. In turn, our results in 
frequency distributions show that the number of subjects who contri-
buted induced values gradually decreases as induced values, v, increase 
from $2 to $8 in the incentive-compatible PCM, especially with 
b = 1/3. Thus, we conjecture that a different kind of motive, such as 
spitefulness, may emerge when the required contribution for group 
efficiency is close to a whole endowment even under the efficient 






Figure 5. Mean, Median, and Induced Value for Each Treatment of b ={0.1,0.2,1/3,0.6,0.9} 340    April 2010  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 
 
 
PCM is incentive-compatible, and instead follow a 
symmetric N.E. strategy. When the PCM is not 
incentive-compatible, subjects gradually reduce 
their contributions as b gets close to one. 
  Note that the LS estimates of a random effects 
model are not similar to those of the quantile 
regressions above the median (see Table 4). For 
instance, the estimated intercept of constant terms 
in the LS approach is significantly below an 
induced value of v for each regression, while it is 
approximately equal to v in the results of quantile 
regression above the median (θ={0.8,0.7,0.6, 
0.5}). The apparent cause for this discrepancy is 
that LS estimates are very sensitive with the 
outliers observed in the experiments and that the 
distributions of contributions are not normally 
distributed (see Figures 2, 3, and 4). In this situa-
tion, we have to rely on a large sample property 
to validate an LS approach of random effects 
models and its corresponding t or F tests. How-
ever, the number of observations for each regres-
sion is 450, so an LS approach is not reliable. 
Therefore it can be concluded that the quantile re-
gressions better capture the distribution of con-
tribution behaviors. 
  What can we learn from the regression and 
statistical results? First, contributing the induced 
values of the public good is pervasive in an in-
centive-compatible PCM, while high heterogene-
ity of contributions is observed in a non–incen-
tive-compatible  PCM, as shown in quantile re-
gressions and frequency distributions. On the 
whole, contributions are decreasing in b, which 
seems to indicate that the helping hand motiva-
tion plays a role. Second, the induced values for 
the public good may be a key determinant in 
characterizing over-contribution observed in this 
experiment. Economic theory predicts that a zero 
contribution is a unique dominant strategy for b= 
{0.6,0.9}. However, the frequency distributions 
are clearly different across v={2,5,8} for the 
same value of b={0.6,0.9}, and high induced 
values positively impact over-contribution, which 
is in line with the findings established in the 
threshold public goods experiments (Rondeau, Poe, 
and Schulze 2005, Rondeau, Schulze, and Poe 
1999). Thus, we further conjecture that the help-
ing hand term may have the property of being at 





Despite widespread use of matching-grant mecha-
nisms to fund environmental, natural resource, 
and conservation projects throughout the world, 
little is known about why this mechanism may 
help increase voluntary contributions. This re-
search has introduced a new experimental mecha-
nism, referred to as the proportional contribution 
mechanism (PCM), that enables an examination of 
the nature of voluntary public good contributions 
in single-shot settings. The uniqueness of the PCM 
comes from the fact that it can be modified to be 
both incentive-compatible or not by adjusting 
only one parameter. This is not possible with 
other voluntary mechanisms. 
  A conceptual framework and model of the help-
ing hand hypothesis were formulated. The help-
ing hand hypothesis asserts that when a person 
faces an external environment that is not incen-
tive-compatible and that seems unlikely to pro-
vide a socially optimal level of the public good, 
the individual gains some utility by undertaking 
socially responsible behaviors. However, when 
the mechanism is incentive-compatible and thus 
seems likely to provide a socially optimal level of 
the public good, the individual no longer offers a 
helping hand, but instead focuses on maximizing 
her personal payoff, bringing the individual’s 
behavior in line with the standard Nash equili-
brium predictions. 
  The experimental results are consistent with the 
helping hand hypothesis. When the mechanism is 
incentive-compatible, subjects report warm-glow–
free values for public goods via voluntary contri-
butions. When the PCM is not incentive-compati-
ble, contributions decrease as the price of contri-
butions (reflected by parameter b) increases, but 
are positively correlated with induced values. This 
implies that when the mechanism is not incentive-
compatible, people offer a helping hand and gain 
utility by undertaking a socially responsible be-
havior. 
  The research results further suggest that over-
contribution reflects, in part, the value for the 
public good and can be considered partial demand 
revelation even in a non–incentive-compatible 
mechanism. These trends observed in the experi-
mental results are novel and are consistent with 
the helping hand hypothesis outlined. Overall, our 
results suggest that people’s social preferences 
depend on the induced value of the public good Kotani, Messer, and Schulze  Matching Grants and Charitable Giving   341 
 
 
Table 4. Estimates of Regressions for Different Induced Values 
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0.48   
Notes: N = 450 for each induced value. * indicates significance below 0.05. Additional regression statistics are available from the 
authors upon request. 
 
 
as well as on its price, and thus that people pos-
sess an efficiency concern in voluntary contribu-
tion behavior. 
  Note that, at the individual level, data and re-
gression analyses remain incomplete when the 
PCM is not incentive-compatible. Consistent with 
previous VCM research, the quantile regressions 
reveal a variety of individual contribution behav-
iors. A significant portion of subjects behave 
according to the helping hand prediction, another 
group of subjects contribute at levels equivalent 
to their induced values, and a small fraction of 
subjects continuously free-ride. However, we did 
not estimate a set of individual-specific parame-
ters because of the small degrees of freedom. 
Identifying these types of cooperative behavior 
remains an area of research to be addressed in the 
future. 
  Finally, these research results have implications 
for the discussions on the measurement of bene-
fits in environmental and natural resource pro-
jects. Many WTP estimates for environmental 
goods are obtained by employing non–incentive-
compatible mechanisms. As represented by the 
discussion between Kahneman and Knetsch (1992) 
and Smith (1992), whether to include WTPs for 
environmental goods in the benefit-cost analysis 
remains an unsettled issue. These experimental 
results support the idea that contributions or 
WTPs driven by helping hand motivations should 
be counted in benefit-cost analyses, since they 
reflect, at least in part, the value of the public 
good even when the mechanism is not incentive-
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